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Abstract
One of the recurrent themes in the debate around how to ensure global food
security concerns the capacity of the planet to support its growing population.
Neo-Malthusian thinking suggests that we are in a situation in which further
expansion of the population cannot be supported and that the population
checks, with their dismal consequences envisaged by Malthus, will lead to a new
era of stagnant incomes and population. More sophisticated models of the link
between population and income are less gloomy, however. They see population
growth as an integral component of the economic growth which is necessary to
ensure that the poorest achieve food security. An undue focus on the difficulties
of meeting the demands of the increasing population risks damaging this
growth. Instead, attention should be focused on ensuring that the conditions to
ensure that economic growth accompanies population growth are in place.
Introduction
One of the themes in the current debate around food
security is a renewed interest in the population theories of
Thomas Malthus which highlight the issue of what size of
population the planet can sustain. Interest stems from the
unprecedented increases in population which are currently
being experienced and concern that these may not be sus-
tainable with a fixed endowment of natural resources. The
Malthusian observation that unchecked population
growth proceeds geometrically whilst food production can
only increase (at best) arithmetically, brings to mind an
analogy with a growing population of micro-organisms
on a Petri dish which is eventually checked by the size of
the dish and the availability of nutrients.
Malthus is widely blamed for giving Economics the
reputation for being the dismal science. The reason for
this is his theory of income and population determination
which argued for the existence of a long-run equilibrium
with a stationary population and static (low) levels of
income. Unfortunately for Malthus, soon after he had
presented his theory, both population and income in
Western Europe began their rapid increases of the 19th
century. The mechanisms by which Malthus’ model
achieves its equilibrium concern the bi-directional
relationship between income and population. Increases in
per capita income increase population through reduced
mortality and increased birth rates. Increased population,
however, lowers per capita incomes through a reduction
in labor productivity. These relationships are commonly
referred to as the positive and preventative checks, respec-
tively. In the model, the reduction in productivity is the
consequence of limited natural resources.
The purpose of this article is to outline the subsequent
development of the Malthusian model to better reflect the
reality of industrial and post-industrial economies, and to
argue that focusing only on population growth in isola-
tion from the role that it plays in growth, risks restraining
economic development in those parts of the world where
it is most needed. It will be argued that framing the chal-
lenge as being one of matching food supply to the
demands of a growing population, without taking into
account the ways in which the growing population can
itself contribute to increased food supply, is in danger of
being an over-simplification.
Empirical Evidence
The reasons for the increased concern over the capacity
of the planet to support its population are well rehearsed.
The world’s population recently passed the 7 billion mark
and is predicted to reach 9.3 billion in 2050. Lam (2011)
ª 2012 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and the Association of Applied Biologists. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
3
notes that the time taken for the world’s population to
double from 3 billion in 1960 to 6 billion was 39 years
compared to 70 years for it to double from 1.5 billion to
3 billion and 150 for 0.75 to 1.5 billion. Figure 1 shows
UN population estimates over the period 1950–2100. The
prospective data for the period 2011–2100 are based on
country-level predictions which assume two processes.
The first is based on a double logistic function to capture
the transition from a high fertility rate to the replacement
level of 2.1 children per woman, and is applied to coun-
tries undergoing the demographic transition.1 The second
process is applied to countries which have completed the
transition and is based on a time-series model which
assumes that, in the long term, fertility will approach and
fluctuate around the replacement level of 2.1. Figure 1
shows medium, high, and low variants. The difference
between each of these variants concerns the assumptions
that are made regarding the fertility rate of the popula-
tion. The high variant assumes that fertility in the second
phase is 0.5 children per woman above the medium vari-
ant whilst the low variant assumes it is 0.5 below. Thus,
for a country which has reached the replacement level of
2.1 children per woman in the medium variant, fertility
will be 1.6 and 2.6 children per woman in the low and
high variants, respectively.
Figure 1 is used by Lam (2011) to emphasize that the
growth rate for the world’s population has peaked. Thus
the reductions in doubling time that were seen up to
1999 will not continue. Figure 1 also shows the UN esti-
mates of the population in sub-Saharan Africa where the
population growth rate will continue to be high through-
out the twenty-first century. For example, the annual
growth rate for the global population is 1.1% in 2012
whilst for sub-Saharan Africa it is 2.4%. By 2050 the glo-
bal growth rate is expected to have fallen to 0.4% per
annum whilst that of sub-Saharan Africa will still be
1.6%. This means that, whilst in much of the world pop-
ulation will be relatively static between now and 2050,
sub-Saharan Africa’s will increase from 0.9 billion to
almost 2 billion and as result it is widely argued that it
will have to double its food production over this period.
The picture which emerges from these population sta-
tistics is therefore mixed. At a global level those who
point at the apparently exponential rate of population
growth, and following Malthusian logic predict disaster,
seem to be unduly pessimistic. At a regional level, how-
ever, and in particular in sub-Saharan Africa there would
appear to be more cause for concern. This assumes that
the UN’s medium variant forecast for population growth
is accurate. If reality is such that we end up closer to the
high variant more pessimism may be called for. Under
this variant the population growth rate for sub-Saharan
Africa is above 2% until 2050 and above 0.9% for the rest
of the world until 2054. As a result global population
would increase to 10.6 billion in 2050 and that of sub-
Saharan Africa to 2.2 billion.
Figure 2 shows the fertility rate which is assumed for
sub-Saharan Africa in producing the population projec-
tions in Figure 1. For the period from 2011, the three
lines correspond to low, medium, and high variants as
above. The figure emphasizes the further substantial
decline in fertility rates that must occur if any of the pop-
ulation variants in Figure 1 are to be realized. More
importantly the figure emphasizes the comparatively small
differences in fertility that exist between variants. Com-
pared with a reduction from the current 5.10 children per
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Figure 1. Global and sub-Saharan population 1950–2100 (Source:
United Nations 2011).
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Figure 2. Sub-Saharan fertility rates 1950–2100 (Source: United
Nations 2011).
1The demographic transition refers to the descriptive framework
for patterns of population growth in which high mortality and fer-
tility are gradually replaced by low mortality and fertility (Lee
2011).
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woman to 3.00 in 2045–2050 which would lead to the
medium variant, a reduction to 3.49 would result in the
high variant. The sensitivity of the population estimates
to this assumption therefore demands that consideration
be given to the factors which drive the fertility rate. It is
therefore worth seeking to understand some of the deeper
mechanisms which underpin this key driver of population
growth along with its counterpart, the mortality rate.2
Post-Malthusian Theory
Becker et al. (1990) note that mainstream, or neoclassical,
models of economic growth such as those developed
by Harrod and Solow respond to the failure of the
Malthusian model by essentially ignoring any link between
population and the economy. The Solow (1956) growth
model explains how the level of investment adjusts to
determine the equilibrium capital stock of a country which
in turn determines the level of income. When the capital
stock is low, depreciation, which is a fixed proportion of
the capital stock, is less than investment, so the capital
stock expands. When the capital stock is high, the reverse is
true, and as a result of negative net investment, the capital
stock contracts. With this equilibrium condition, changes
in the relationship between the capital stock and income
cause the economy to grow (or contract); thus, incomes
rise if human capital improves, the labor force increases, or
the savings rate goes up. Technological progress also causes
the economy to grow and one failing of the neo-classical
models is that they treat this as exogenous. A failing which
is rectified in the so-called new or endogenous growth
theories (see, for example, Romer 1990).
In terms of our discussion, the failure of the neo-
classical models to adequately consider the relationship
between population and income is more serious than
their treatment of technological progress as exogenous.
The sensitivity of the population growth rate to changes
in the fertility rate has been highlighted above. Beginning
with Malthus, the fertility rate is of central importance to
models which seek to explain the relationship between
population and income growth. Becker et al. (1960) argue
that Malthus’ theory is built on a “strongly economic
framework” and proceed to provide a “generalization” of
it. They argue that children provide utility, or in their
terminology, psychic income to parents. As such, in an
economic framework, children are classified as a con-
sumption good. They also recognize that this may not sit
easily with many, but emphasize that it is not meant to
imply that the utility derived from children is morally
comparable to that derived from more conventional con-
sumption goods. The advantage of adopting this classifi-
cation, it is argued, is that it makes it possible to relate
the “demand” for children to a well-developed economic
framework which is useful in analyzing patterns in fertil-
ity. Thus, fertility is determined by income, child costs,
knowledge, uncertainty, and tastes. Becker et al. (1960)
also draw an important distinction between the quantity
and quality of children. The latter is the additional utility
that parents draw from children that are the beneficiaries
of better schooling and other activities which are costly to
parents. They argue that children are “normal” goods in
the language of economists, meaning that as incomes
increase, the demand for children increases. They argue,
however, that the demand for the number of children
responds only weakly to income whilst the effect of
income on the quality of children is stronger. A substitu-
tion effect is also present between the quality and quan-
tity of children. Thus, as productivity increases, the price
of consumption decreases relative to that of child rearing
whilst the return on investment in the quality of children
increases. As a result, fertility would be expected to
decline and the quality of children to increase.
A number of economic influences are therefore argued
to affect the fertility rate. First, there is the direct cost of
raising children which is the result of the time that is
spent in raising them. As labor productivity increases, in
particular that of female labor, the opportunity cost of
having children increases. Thus, labor productivity is
negatively related to fertility and the impact of raising
the productivity of female labor in particular will be
apparent. Increased productivity also impacts on the
child-rearing decision by easing the household budget
constraint, which increases the resources available for
children. This is termed the income effect by econo-
mists. The final impact of increased productivity is to
raise the return to human capital, which induces house-
holds to invest in the quality of their children as
opposed to their quantity. The complexity of the rela-
tionship which determines the fertility rate means that
empirical evidence is required to fully understand it. For
example, Lehr (2009) shows that the response of fertility
to productivity differs according to the stage of develop-
ment. Thus, the results provide support for a regime in
which productivity and fertility are positively related in
the early stages of development whilst the reverse is true
in the later stages.
In order to fully address the failure of the Malthusian
model to explain the increases in both population and
2The assumptions made in the UN projections regarding the mor-
tality rate are not discussed here in detail because they have no
bearing on the difference between low, medium, and high projec-
tions. In short, the projections assume that life expectancy
increases at a rate which decreases with current life expectancy.
This assumption is modified in countries where HIV/AIDS is pre-
valent.
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income that have characterized most (if not all) develop-
ing economies, it is necessary to reinstate the link
between population and economic growth, which Becker
et al. (1960) argue is absent in the neo-classical models of
growth that are in the tradition of Harrod and Solow.
Becker et al. (1990) develop a model in which fertility is
determined endogenously. The model assumes that when
fertility is high the current population is less altruistic
toward individuals in the future generation than when
fertility is low. This effect arises because the current gen-
eration is less inclined to invest in one particular individ-
ual when it means depriving others of the same
opportunity. Human nature is such that parents of an
only child devote considerable attention to the future
prospects of that child whilst parents in large families will
spread their attentions more thinly. The result of this is
that high fertility tends to encourage low levels of invest-
ment in human capital. More radically, it is assumed that
the benefit of investing in the development of human
capital is positively related to its existing level. The argu-
ment behind this assumption is essentially that education
requires educated people to start with. The positive
relationship between the return to investment in human
capital and its level creates a positive feedback to invest-
ment in human capital. The combined effect of the
increasing altruism that accompanies lower fertility and
the increasing returns on human capital is to create a sit-
uation in which Becker et al. (1990) are able to show that
there are two possible steady states. One has high levels
of fertility, and little or no investment in human capital,
and the other has low fertility and increased levels of
investment in human capital.
The two steady states predicted by Becker et al. (1990)
resonate well with a world in which some countries seem
to be caught in a Malthusian trap of static income and
population whilst others have demonstrated a sustained
increase in per capita income and population. The model
has little to say about the large number of countries that
are somewhere between the two states, and this is
addressed by the model presented by Galor and Weil
(2000). Their model presents a unified model of growth
across the phases of the demographic transition and it
captures many aspects of both the Becker and neo-classical
models of growth.
The main contribution of the Galor and Weil (2000)
model is that it explains both how an economy can escape
the Malthusian trap and undergo a demographic transi-
tion in which birth rates fall. The key to the former is
that the rate of technological progress is assumed to
increase with population because there is a larger supply
and more rapid diffusion of new ideas. Technological
progress acts on fertility through both an income and a
substitution effect. The income effect arises as the budget
constraint relaxes and more resources can be devoted to
raising children. The substitution effect arises because
more advanced technology demands higher skill levels
and the return on human capital increases which leads to
parents substituting quality for quantity in children. The
two effects act in opposite directions. The income effect
raises fertility and the substitution effect lowers it. Galor
and Weil (2000) argue that in the early stages of growth
the first effect dominates and the rate of population
growth accelerates. As growth proceeds the emphasis
moves toward the substitution effect and the demographic
transition to low fertility rates occurs.
Galor and Weil (2000) thus provide a rationale for a
three-phase population growth process in which the
increasing size of the population plays a crucial role in the
economy escaping from the Malthusian phase. In the
Malthusian phase, population and per capita incomes
grow very slowly and the rate of population growth is neg-
atively related to per capita income. In the second phase,
both population and per capita incomes grow rapidly and
there is a positive relationship between population growth
and income. In the final phase, the relationship between
population growth and output returns to being negative
as in the Malthusian model whilst population and incomes
increase more rapidly than the Malthusian case. Crafts
and Mills (2009) investigate the Galor and Weil (2000)
model empirically, using data for the UK. They find that
some aspects of the model are supported whilst there is
less support for others. In particular, the constant real
wage that is observed up to the Industrial Revolution is
supportive of a Malthusian phase. The preventative and
positive checks that underlie the Malthusian model are
found to be absent for much of this period, however.
Moreover, evidence of the positive feedback from popula-
tion to the rate of technological progress is found to be
absent. Pointing out that these may not be decisive objec-
tions, Crafts and Mills (2009) highlight the role played by
urbanization in the development process and suggest that
focusing on the rapid growth in urban populations may
provide the evidence of a link between population and the
rate of technological progress.
The literature that has been reviewed above focuses on
the role of population growth in economic development.
In considering food security, another important strand of
the literature, which contributes to our understanding of
economic growth, analyses the contribution that agricul-
ture makes to economic growth through its underpinning
of growth in a non-agricultural sector. In this literature,
the economy comprises two sectors, one agricultural and
the other industrial or urban. The seminal paper is Lewis
(1954). A number of mechanisms act to transfer the ben-
efits of technological progress in the agricultural sector to
the industrial sector. The first is the release of resources.
6 © 2012 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and the Association of Applied Biologists
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Improvements in productivity mean that labor is released
from agriculture and transferred to the industrial sector.
In a similar vein, agriculture can supply the capital neces-
sary to finance industrial development or the provision of
public goods by the state. The transfer of capital from
agriculture to the industrial sector remains important
because, in spite of the liberalization of capital markets, it
is well established that for a large majority of countries,
investment relies primarily on domestic savings (Ventura
1997). In addition to this direct transfer of resources away
from agriculture, output growth in agriculture is also
likely to result in a decrease in the price of food, which is
a wage good, and hence to induce economic growth
through two mechanisms. A relatively low price of food
allows industrialists to pay low wages, which boosts the
profitability and competitiveness of the industrial sector.
Furthermore, a decline in the price of food effectively
increases the real income of net purchasers of food, and
the resulting disposable income can help stimulate
demand for non-agricultural products. Becker et al.
(1999) extend the Becker et al. (1990) model to reflect
the fact that the creation of an urban sector may be nec-
essary to give the increasing returns to human capital that
were assumed in the Becker et al. (1990) model. This
modification reinforces the low-income, low-population
growth equilibrium, and emphasizes the importance of
urbanization for the achievement of the low-fertility,
high-income growth phase.
Reasons for Optimism
The lessons from economic history regarding the veracity
of the Malthus model are clear. The empirical evidence is
strongly against the fact of us being caught in a trap in
which population and incomes are constrained by the
laws of biology and economics which lead to catastrophe
when the “natural” capacity is exceeded. Beyond this, the
literature that has been discussed above offers some
insights into how our resources will act to limit popula-
tion. These resources extend beyond those with which we
are endowed naturally to include resources that are cre-
ated including population, capital (both human and phys-
ical), and technology. The argument is that mankind does
not inhabit a global Petri dish in which the population
grows until such time as the dish reaches its carrying
capacity when the population will be checked. Rather, we
live in a world in which individuals make decisions which
collectively have an impact on the size of the global pop-
ulation. Decisions on fertility are clearly central, but also
important are decisions over other factors which will
increase carrying capacity, such as investment in physical
and human capital and technological progress. The the-
ory, albeit with limited empirical evidence, which has
been discussed above suggests that countries tend to fol-
low a three-phase process of population and income
growth where the first phase is characterized by limited
growth of both, the second by rapid growth of both, and
the third in which population growth slows but incomes
continue to rise. This phased view of the transition in a
developing economy is echoed by Tiffen (2003) who pro-
vides a narrative account of development to address her
concern that formal mathematical models of development
are unable to capture adequately the differing features of
the phases in development. The phases of development
identified in both the formal and informal models
confirm the patterns discussed in the section above on
empirical evidence but, as noted by Lee (2011), these
forecasts do not incorporate the formal models discussed
in the section on post-Malthusian theory to any degree. It
is clear, however, that the model of, for example, Galor
and Weil (2000) potentially provides a rigorous frame-
work supporting the patterns exhibited by the forecasts.
We have argued that it is important that we do not see
the process by which we develop new technology to meet
the food security challenge as somehow detached from the
process of population growth. This highlights the fact that
the challenge is not merely to develop the technology to
feed 9 billion people in 2050 in a detached way. More accu-
rately, scientific discovery and technological development
respond and contribute to a process of economic develop-
ment of which a growing population is one manifestation.
We are participants in this process, not the invisible hand
which acts to increase the supply of food or to check popu-
lation growth. If the arguments of Galor and Weil (2000)
are accepted, the process of population growth is in fact an
essential component of the growth of economies which will
allow them to produce sufficient food. Crudely, parents
will only make the decision to invest in the human capital
of their children once their incomes have increased and ini-
tially at least, the income growth may lead to an increase in
fertility. This increase in fertility, however, brings about the
increase in the urban population that fuels the increases in
human capital that allows an economy to escape the
Malthusian trap.
Addressing the challenge of ensuring that the planet is
able to feed itself is therefore not simply confined to
matching food supply to food demand. It is also about
understanding and encouraging the other features which
accompany a growing population. This entails a consider-
ation of how we facilitate the change made by parents from
high levels of fertility to high levels of investment in human
capital. Furthermore, consideration should be given to how
best to ensure the quality of life of urban populations, and
to encourage investment in human and physical capital.
Once population growth is seen as one of the essential
elements of the transition to a developed, high-income
© 2012 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and the Association of Applied Biologists 7
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economy, calls for population growth to be curtailed in for
example sub-Saharan Africa are seen as unduly alarmist. It
is crucial, if these parts of the world are to develop and feed
themselves, that they should be allowed to follow patterns
of development which include population growth.
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